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Eternal Recurrence and the Categorical Imperative
Philip J. Kain
Santa Clara University

I
Nietzsche embraces the doctrine of eternal recurrence for the first time at Gay Science
§341:1

The greatest weight.—What, if some day or night a demon were to steal after you
into your loneliest loneliness and say to you: "This life as you now live it and have
lived it, you will have to live once more and innumerable times more; and there will be
nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy and every thought and sigh and
everything unutterably small or great in your life will have to return to you, all in the
same succession and sequence—even this spider and this moonlight between the trees,
and even this moment and I myself. The eternal hourglass of existence is turned upside
down again and again, and you with it, speck of dust!"
Would you not throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and curse the demon who
spoke thus? Or have you once experienced a tremendous moment when you would
have answered him: "You are a god and never have I heard anything more divine." If
this thought gained possession of you, it would change you as you are or perhaps crush

you. The question in each and every thing, "Do you desire this once more and
innumerable times more?" would lie upon your actions as the greatest weight. Or how
well disposed would you have to become to yourself and to life to crave nothing more
fervently than this ultimate eternal confirmation and seal?2

It is not enough that eternal recurrence simply be believed. Nietzsche demands that it
actually be loved. In Ecce Homo, he explains his doctrine of amor fati: "My formula for
greatness in a human being is amor fati: that one wants nothing to be different, not forward,
not backward, not in all eternity. Not merely bear what is necessary, still less conceal it…but
love it."3 In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche says: "'To redeem those who lived in the past
and to recreate all 'it was' into a 'thus I willed it'—that alone should I call redemption."4 To
turn all "it was" into a "thus I willed it" is to accept fate fully, to love it. One would have it no
other way, one wants everything eternally the same, "Was that life?….Well then! Once
more!'"5
Some commentators raise the question of whether Nietzsche intends eternal recurrence to
be like a categorical imperative.6 At Gay Science §341, we have just seen, Nietzsche said:
"The question in each and every thing, 'Do you desire this once more and innumerable times
more?' would lie upon your actions as the greatest weight."7 In the Nachlass, he also writes:
"My doctrine declares: the task is to live in such a way that you must wish to live again—you
will anyway."8
On the other hand, though, in Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche says:
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Let us consider finally what naïvety it is to say 'man ought to be thus and
thus!'….The individual is, in his future and in his past, a piece of fate….To say to
him 'change yourself' means to demand that everything should change, even in the
past…9

The obvious objection to understanding eternal recurrence as like a categorical
imperative, it would seem, is that for a categorical imperative to make any sense, for
moral obligation to make any sense, it must be possible for individuals to change
themselves. And Nietzsche denies that individuals can change themselves. Magnus
thinks the determinism "implicit in the doctrine of the eternal recurrence of the same
renders any imperative impotent….How can one will what must happen in any case?"10
Eternal recurrence seems to deny that an ought can make any sense at all.
At the other end of the spectrum, those who do hold that eternal recurrence is like a
categorical imperative, for their part, tend to ignore or deny that eternal recurrence is
eternal recurrence of the same, that is, they ignore the determinism involved in eternal
recurrence.11 In this article, then, I want to explore the extent to which it can be claimed
that eternal recurrence is like a categorical imperative without underestimatng Nietzsche's
belief in determinism.
We must be careful to remember, then, that eternal recurrence is eternal recurrence of
the same.12 That means that it is impossible to do anything in our present life that we
have not done in our previous lives. Nothing new or different can occur. Nevertheless,
the only thing that follows from this, the only thing we can deduce from what has gone
on up to the present point in our current life, is that every detail must have been repeated
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in our past lives (assuming, of course, that eternal recurrence is true). We do not know
yet, in our present life, what we are going to do during the rest of our life. And eternal
recurrence is able to tell us nothing at all about that. Eternal recurrence gives me no
information ahead of time about what I can or cannot do in the rest of my present life. It
is merely the case, rather, that whatever I do end up doing tells me what I must have done
over and over in past lives and will do again in future lives.
If I believe the truth of eternal recurrence, then I believe that in my present life I
cannot change anything from my past lives, but I also realize that I cannot know ahead of
time what I am about to do, that is, what it is I must do in my present life. The fact that I
take whatever I will do in the future to be strictly determined, the fact that it is fated, does
not give me any information whatsoever about what it is that is fated. It does not tell me
that I must do this rather than that. It gives me no information whatsoever about the
details of my fate. Only once I do whatever I do can I know that it was the outcome of
the whole past and of all past pasts. In short, all this determinism, rigid as it is, tells me
nothing of what I am going to do in my present life.
What, then, is the point of all the emphasis Nietzsche puts on determinism, if it gives
us no guidelines concerning future action in this life? The point, I suggest, is merely to
generate a certain attitude toward whatever it is we end up doing. This is what Nietzsche
means, I think, when he says you should "live in such a way that you must wish to live
again", and immediately adds, "you will anyway." He is not suggesting that we do
something different from our last recurrence, nor something that is not the fated outcome
of all past history. That, he thinks, is impossible. He is merely suggesting a certain
attitude toward whatever it is we finally do.
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But still, isn't it impossible for attitudes to change from life to life? Aren't they too
the outcome of all past history? At Gay Science §341, Nietzsche said that if the thought
of eternal recurrence "gained possession of you, it would change you as you are or
perhaps crush you."13 This might be taken to suggest that attitudes can change. The
claim that the thought of eternal recurrence "would change you as you are" suggests that
in some sense you change, though also it suggests that in some sense you do not. Eternal
recurrence "would change you," yet you would remain "as you are." We might be
tempted to understand this as implying that attitudes can change in the sense that attitudes
can arise that were not the outcome of past history.14 But I do not think we need assume
that this is what Nietzsche means. We should not water down his determinism without
being compelled to do so for good reason.
It is quite possible to stick with the interpretation that all things, even attitudes, are
the outcome of past history and still make sense of change in attitude. The basic
characteristic of past history, its strict determinism, plus the fact that our life must be
lived again and again, if we were to reflect upon this, if "this thought gained possession
of" us, could easily cause (in perfect compatibility with the strictest determinism) a
certain attitude in us, say, the attitude that we should accept this determinism and go
along with it, or, as Nietzsche chooses to put it, the attitude that we should "live in such a
way that [we] must wish to live again—[we] will anyway." Thus, it can make perfect
sense to say that reflecting on the determinism of past history (together with the fact that
it will return eternally) could change us as we are. This explanation of change is not at
all incompatible with the determinism Nietzsche subscribes to, indeed, it is simply a
result of it. It is perfectly acceptable to hold that past history contains processes that
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produce changes from one historical moment to the next, it is just that once we see what
in fact those changes are we must take them to have been fated, strictly determined, and
thus we must accept that it would be impossible to change them from the way they
actually have been determined by past history (as well as by past cycles).
So also, reflecting upon this determinism, upon the fact that nothing can be changed,
upon the fact that all is fated, might cause a further attitude, perhaps the attitude that:
'Fine, I wouldn't change it anyway!' And if such an attitude were produced in us, then
when we hear about eternal recurrence it might strike us as divine. When we hear about
our fate, we might love it. We might even be able to turn "all 'it was' into a 'thus I willed
it'."15 When we hear about all this rigid determinism, we could conceivably "crave
nothing more fervently than this ultimate eternal confirmation and seal…"16
So far, then, we have explained the sense in which change is possible for Nietzsche.
The question is whether this is enough to allow us to say that eternal recurrence is like a
categorical imperative?
I think we can say that eternal recurrence gives us an imperative. In Thus Spoke
Zarathustra, Nietzsche himself writes: "Once man believed in soothsayers and
stargazers, and therefore believed: 'All is destiny: you ought to, for you must.'"17 This is
to say that all our actions are fated, determined, they cannot be changed, and thus we
"must." But it is also to say that we should have a certain attitude toward this fate, that
we accept it, will it, love it, that we "ought." In short, the imperative is that we ought to
"live in such a way that [we] must wish to live again—[we] will anyway."
Once we adopt this attitude, but not before, we can be sure that we adopted it in all
past lives. Only then can we be sure that this attitude has been fated—that we had no
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choice but to adopt it. But until we adopt this attitude, we do not know whether or not we
are fated to do so. We cannot know ahead of time what our reaction will be when we
finally realize that all is fated. Our reaction could be one of horror such that we will be
crushed by the fatedness of our actions. Or the fact that all is fated, once "this thought
gained possession of" us, might cause an attitude of acceptance. Furthermore,
Nietzsche's urging us to "live in such a way that [we] must wish to live again—[we] will
anyway," together with his further reflections on eternal recurrence and amor fati, might
just be the factors that tip us in the right direction. Thus it seems to me quite legitimate to
understand Nietzsche's urging as an imperative.
We can also say, I think, that the imperative which eternal recurrence gives us
involves a form of universalization—indeed, the ultimate universalization. Borrowing
Kant's language, we could say that Nietzsche wants us to act on those maxims we could
will be repeated eternally—we will anyway.18
Nevertheless, there are enormous differences between Kant and Nietzsche that we
must attend to. Perhaps the most important is that the Übermensch can will that anything
be repeated eternally. After all, he19 turns all "it was" into a "thus I willed it."20 He loves
every detail of his life no matter what it is. Suppose we consider an action like telling a
lie. For Kant, we cannot universalize telling a lie and thus we should not tell one.
Nietzsche, of course, does not think that discovering whether or not a maxim is
universalizable will or should determine our behavior one way or the other. After all,
whether we lie or not is determined by all past history and its eternal recurrence—it is
fated. It cannot be determined by the rational analysis of maxims alone. Unlike the
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categorical imperative, then, eternal recurrence has nothing to do with the moral rightness
of actions.
Nietzsche is not concerned with whether or not we tell a lie. He is concerned with the
attitude we adopt toward whatever action we do take. He wants us to love every detail of
our lives—whether we told a lie or not. What matters is not whether we lied, but whether
we love our actions. Eternal recurrence is not concerned with what is affirmed, only with
affirmation. The Übermensch can act so as to violate the moral law in the most
objectionable way, and yet still love every detail of his life. As Owen and AnsellPearson point out, the categorical imperative commands ethical content; eternal
recurrence does not.21
Nietzsche, then, cannot live up to the demands of the Kantian form of
universalization. We might also ask, though, whether Kant could live up to the demands
of the Nietzschean form of universalization? Can Kant fulfill the Nietzschean demand
that he act only on that maxim he could will be repeated eternally? Could Kant live in
such a way that he must wish to live again—he will anyway? Suppose that you have led
a moral life in the Kantian sense, acting for the sake of the categorical imperative at every
step—or that you have come as close to this as would be possible for a human being.
Would you therefore be willing to live your life again—would you be willing to live it
again an infinite number of times? Could the Kantian categorical imperative be expected
to produce amor fati? The moral law, Kant says, does produce in us a feeling of
respect—a feeling self-wrought by a rational concept.22 It would produce in us respect
for the moral law and presumably even more so for a moral law that had succeeded in (or
come close to) regulating an entire life. Well then, could we expect that a life so
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regulated by the moral law would engender in us sufficient respect that we should be
willing to live that life again? To put it in shorthand, could the Kantian categorical
imperative lead to amor fati—the embracing of Nietzschean eternal recurrence?
A much more likely reaction, to be honest, would be that of Aeneas, the most pious of
men, who nevertheless was appalled when he discovered that he would have to live his
life again.23 If there is anything about a moral life that should make one want to live it
again, an infinite number of times, I do not see what it would be.24
Indeed, I think that the prospect of living one's life over and over again an infinite
number of times, once "this thought gained possession of you," would sap the Kantian
moral life of its very significance. Whatever appeal a moral life might have would be
undermined by the prospect of repeating it infinitely. Eternal recurrence obviously
implies that there is no noumenal realm, no transcendental self, no freedom of the
Kantian sort. Every action, every thought, every reflection returns eternally and exactly
the same. We have determinism, causality, heteronomy—all the way down. While
acting autonomously on the moral law, in Kant's view, would produce in us a sense of
dignity,25 the prospect of being fated to repeat that same exact action an infinite number
of times, far from producing an increased sense of dignity, would eliminate autonomy
and so subvert any dignity.
Thus, while actions are universalizable for Nietzsche, they are not universalizable in
Kant's sense. We might say that for Nietzsche they are subjectively universalizable.
Whether one is able to universalize them depends upon one's subjectivity—one's attitude.
Such universalization is not something objective, something we can expect of all rational
beings. The Übermensch can will to universalize every detail of his life—will to repeat it
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eternally—but this is clearly not the case for everyone. Most people, in fact, would be
crushed by the idea of eternal recurrence. Moreover, the Übermensch is able to
universalize what for Kant is not universalizable. On the other hand, Kant would not be
able to live up to the demands of Nietzschean universalization—he could not accept
eternal recurrence.

II
In comparing eternal recurrence and the categorical imperative, then, we have major
differences between Nietzsche and Kant. And one of the main differences is that Nietzsche's
views on eternal recurrence seem to have little to do with morality. We must begin to explain,
then, the way in which Nietzsche's views on eternal recurrence are connected with moral
matters. Nietzsche says that we should live in such a way that we must wish to live again—we
will anyway. This means that we should act as if our acts were all fated—they are anyway.
The consequence of this, we must now see, is that we should act as if our acts were all
innocent—they are anyway. Eternal recurrence, Nietzsche thinks, redeems us from guilt and
makes us innocent. This must be explained.
In the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche claims that:

man was surrounded by a fearful void—he did not know how to justify, to
account for, to affirm himself; he suffered from the problem of his meaning. He
also suffered otherwise, he was in the main a sickly animal: but his problem was
not suffering itself, but that there was no answer to the crying question, "why do I
suffer?"

10

Man…the one most accustomed to suffering, does not repudiate suffering as
such; he desires it, he even seeks it out, provided he is shown a meaning for it, a
purpose of suffering. The meaninglessness of suffering, not suffering itself, was
the curse that lay over mankind…26

We live in an empty and meaningless cosmos, a cosmos that does not care about us,
and we cannot face this. Suffering we can handle, but meaningless suffering, suffering
for no reason at all, we cannot handle. So what do we do? Nietzsche thinks we give
suffering a meaning. We invent a meaning. We create an illusion. The Greeks
constructed gods for whom wars and other forms of suffering were festival plays and thus
occasions to be celebrated by the poets. Christians imagine a God for whom suffering is
punishment for sin.27
Nietzsche even thinks we used to enjoy inflicting suffering on others:

To see others suffer does one good, to make others suffer even more….[I]n the
days when mankind was not yet ashamed of its cruelty, life on earth was more
cheerful than it is now….Today, when suffering is always brought forward as the
principal argument against existence, as the worst question mark, one does well to
recall the ages in which the opposite opinion prevailed because men were
unwilling to refrain from making suffer and saw in it an enchantment of the first
order, a genuine seduction to life.28
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Why was the infliction of suffering so enjoyable? Why was it a seduction to life?
The answer is not, I do not think, that people of past ages were just sadists, as Danto and
others seem to think.29 Rather, since meaningless suffering is unbearable, we give it a
meaning. We make it a punishment and inflict it ourselves. In doing so, suffering is no
longer meaningless, it is made to participate in the web of meaning we have created.
That is why it is so enjoyable to inflict suffering. That is why it is a seduction to life. We
keep meaninglessness at bay. We engage in practices that invest suffering with the
meaning it must have for us. We unconsciously participate in the imposition of meaning.
But we are not content, in Nietzsche's opinion, merely to inflict suffering on others.
We go further. We inflict it upon ourselves. As society develops and we are unable to
discharge our instincts outwardly, we direct them within. We create guilt.30 And priests
are quick to nurture this new development.31 Just as we inflict suffering on others to keep
meaningless suffering at bay, so we inflict it upon ourselves. We give all suffering a
meaning. No meaningless suffering is allowed to remain—anywhere. Meaninglessness
is eradicated. And just as inflicting suffering on others was a seduction to life, so in
inflicting it on ourselves, "life again became very interesting…one no longer protested
against pain, one thirsted for pain; 'more pain! more pain!'"32
Nietzsche finds all of this highly objectionable. And he will not accept any of it. He
rejects it completely. He wants to restore the innocence of existence. He wants to rid the
world of guilt and punishment:

This instinct of revenge has so mastered mankind in the course of millennia that
the whole of metaphysics, psychology, conception of history, but above all
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morality, is impregnated with it.…He has made even God ill with it, he has
deprived existence in general of its innocence; namely, by tracing back every state
of being thus and thus to a will, an intention, a responsible act. The entire
doctrine of the will, this most fateful falsification in psychology hitherto, was
essentially invented for the sake of punishment….[T]he priests at the head of the
oldest communality: they wanted to create for themselves a right to take
revenge—they wanted to create for God a right to take revenge. To this end, man
was conceived of as "free"; to this end, every action had to be conceived of as
willed.…[W]e halcyonians especially are trying with all our might to withdraw,
banish, and extinguish the concepts of guilt and punishment from the world…33

Thus, Nietzsche's position is that because we cannot accept meaningless suffering, we have
given it a meaning—as punishment. We inflict punishment ourselves to invest it with a
meaning. In fact, we go even further, we inflict suffering on ourselves internally—we invent
guilt. We also invent a will and thus responsibility so that we can be held guilty and so that
God can have a right to inflict punishment. Nietzsche wants to reject this whole set of
meanings that have been given to suffering, return us to the innocence of existence, and
construct a different meaning for suffering. Nietzsche says of Buddhism that it did not need
"to make its suffering and capacity for pain decent to itself by interpreting it as sin—it merely
says what it feels: 'I suffer'."34 Eternal recurrence, likewise, reduces our suffering just to the
suffering. There are no psychological surpluses or increases.
If our actions repeat eternally, if they must repeat eternally, if they are not something
we can change, if they are fated, then we cannot be held responsible for them, we cannot
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be guilty of anything. It makes no sense to see our suffering as punishment. We are
innocent. Our suffering is not a retribution. It just happens. One is no longer
accountable.35 We are redeemed from sin and guilt.36 Nietzsche says, we must "take the
concept of punishment which has overrun the whole world and root it out!" It has
"robbed of its innocence the whole purely chance character of events."37 Fate, necessity,
eternal recurrence restore the innocence of existence.

III
To conclude, I think the preceding has shown that despite Nietzsche's commitment to an
extreme form of determinism, there is no problem in his advocating that we live in such a way
that we must wish to live again—we will anyway. Moreover, it is not unreasonable to describe
this as an imperative. Furthermore, this imperative urges us to act as if our acts were all
innocent—they are anyway. None of this requires us to act any differently. It certainly does
not require changing the past—let alone the whole of past history or our past lives. It simply
tries to change the way we view our actions. It tries to redeem them. It tries to redeem them
from sin and guilt. And thus it does not seem to me unreasonable to describe what we have
here as in some sense a moral imperative. And since this moral imperative has a certain
universal and necessary quality to it, I can see nothing wrong with calling it a categorical
imperative. Though, again, we must be careful to remember all of the deep differences that
have been pointed out between Nietzsche's categorical imperative and Kant's.
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